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In October 2005 the 16th Central Committee of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party (CCP) held its 5th Plenary Session. The Central Committee 
usually meets every year in the fall in a plenary session that sets out 
major policy guidelines for the Chinese leadership. This time the most 
important task of the plenum was to review a draft proposal for 11th 
Five-Year Plan covering the period 2006-11 (CCP Central Committee 
Proposal on Formulating the 11th Five-Year Programme for National 
Economic and Social Development).
The 5th Plenary Session marked the ﬁrst time that Hu Jintao was un-
disputably in charge of heading a major meeting of the top leadership 
in China. Hu Jintao assumed the position as party general secretary at 
the 16th Party Congress in November 2002, when Jiang Zemin stepped 
down after having served as party head since 1989. In March 2003 
Jiang also handed over the post as president to Hu Jintao, but only in 
November 2004, at the 4th Plenum, did Jiang step down as chairman of 
the Central Military Commission (Brødsgaard 2004). In short this was 
the ﬁrst plenary session where Hu Jintao appeared as formal head of 
both party and state as well as the military. 
Prior to the conference it was rumoured that major personnel changes 
would be announced. Hong Kong sources reported that Hu Jintao would 
use the opportunity to consolidate his power by having Li Keqiang ap-
pointed to the politburo (Holbig 2005). The 50 year old Li Keqiang is 
party secretary of Liaoning Province and widely believed to be one of 
the most likely candidates to form the core of the new ﬁfth generation 
that will take over when Hu Jintao retires at the 18th Party Congress 
in 2012. Li holds a PhD in Economics from Peking University and has 
made a career in the Communist Youth League, which is regarded as 
Hu Jintao's power base. Li Keqiang is former party secretary of Henan 
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Province and was in December 2004 brought to the crisis-stricken Liaon-
ing Province. He seems to have succeeded in restructuring the province 
and is apparently ready to move on to new assignments.
For some months there have also been speculations that Hu Jintao 
would ﬁre the Shanghai party leader Chen Liangyu, who belongs to 
Jiang Zemin's so-called Shanghai faction. By retiring Chen, Hu Jintao 
would weaken Jiang Zemin's power base and further consolidate his own 
position. The most obvious candidate to succeed Chen Liangyu is Liu 
Yundong, who currently heads the CCP's United Front Department. 
In the end, no major personnel changes took place in connection with 
the plenum. This can be taken as an indication of continued strength on 
behalf of Jiang Zemin and his Shanghai faction. However, it may also 
indicate that it is wrong to assume that there is a latent power struggle 
between Hu and Jiang. So far the transition from Jiang's third generation 
to Hu's fourth generation has taken place in an orderly and peaceful 
fashion without any major clashes. This is not to say that Hu is copy-
ing Jiang's urban and coastal-based strategies, but apparently policy 
differences can now be handled in a more professional and regularized 
fashion in China.
11th Five-Year Plan
The draft to the new Five-Year Plan reﬂects the new development strat-
egy of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao. It is a strategy that is based on three 
important concepts that have been formulated and elaborated since 
the 16th Party Congress. These concepts are the 'scientiﬁc development 
concept' (kexue fazhanguan), 'taking the people as the foundation' (yiren 
wei ben) for development, and 'harmonious society' (hexie shehui).
The new strategy acknowledges that the one-sided focus on growth 
in recent years has had negative social, political and ecological conse-
quences. A huge income gap between rural and urban areas, between 
rich coastal provinces and between new and old social groups has 
opened up, threatening the social fabric and political stability. The focus 
on quantitative development indicators has also resulted in a blind use 
of natural resources with adverse consequences for the environment. 
Instead a policy of balanced and coordinated development between rural 
and urban areas, between the economy and society, and between dif-
ferent regions will be adopted. This policy of balanced and coordinated 
development forms the core of the 'scientiﬁc development concept' and 
is closely related to the concept of 'taking people as the main foundation', 
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which focuses on the qualitative and human-related aspects of social 
and economic change (Communiqué of the 3rd Plenary Session of the 
16th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party).
The departure from the previous emphasis on the speed of GDP 
growth also involves a new focus on sustainable development. This 
means that in formulating economic policies, attention must be given 
to both short-term and long-term costs and gains and to the views and 
interests of all sections of society. Otherwise it will be impossible to 
achieve the new overarching social and political goal—a harmonious 
society (hexie shehui).
 The concept of harmonious society was ﬁrst propagated in the Resolu-
tion of the 16th Party Congress in November 2002 and further elaborated 
at the 4th Plenary Session of the 16th Central Committee in September 
2004.1 In an important speech by Hu Jintao from February 2005, but 
only published in July 2005, the Chinese leader argues that harmonious 
society is the 'foundation for the consolidation of the governing capac-
ity of the party and the realization of its leading role' (Hu Jintao 2005).
Associated with the new focus on a 'people-centred' development 
strategy are plans to implement a green GDP index system. The new 
system intends to provide a measure of the relationship between eco-
nomic growth, welfare and environmental changes and it will place a 
premium on local cadres' success in addressing issues concerning medi-
cal care, education, recreation and environmental protection.
Objectives and Goals
Concrete objectives for economic and social development during the 
'11-5' period, as the 11th Five-Year Plan period is called in Chinese 
publications, include the following measures (CCP Central Committee 
Proposal on Formulating the 11th Five-Year Programme):
1. Doubling the 2000 per capita GDP in 2010.
2. Markedly improving efﬁciency in utilizing resources, including 
reducing energy consumption per unit of GDP by 20 percent by 
2010.
3. Developing a number of major enterprises into internationally 
competitive companies with well-known brands.
4. Improving the market economic system and achieving a basic equi-
librium in the balance of international payments.
5. Universalizing and consolidating nine-year compulsory education 
_________________________________________________________________________95
____________________________________________________ The Fifth Plenary Session
and developing a sound social security system.
6. Improving the income levels and the quality of life for urban and 
rural residents and keeping the overall price level stable.
7. Signiﬁcantly improving living, transportation, educational, cultural, 
health and environmental conditions for the population.
8. Progress in building democracy, legal institutions and spiritual 
civilization.
9. Further advancing social order and production safety and making 
progress in building a harmonious society.
Per capita GDP in China in the year 2000 amounted to 7,086 yuan and 
given the present economic growth rate, it seems likely that the goal 
of doubling this ﬁgure to 14,172 yuan is realistic. In fact, at the end of 
2004, the per capita GDP had already increased by 51 percent to 10,561 
yuan (Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2001: 49; Zhongguo tongji nianjian 2005: 
51). With the recent adjustment of the China's GDP, which has resulted 
in an increase of about 17 percent, the goal will undoubtedly be reached 
well ahead of 2010.
More efﬁcient use of resources might be more difﬁcult to attain. 
However, given the present shortage of global energy resources, it is 
imperative to pay attention to this issue. According to ofﬁcial statis-
tics, China consumes 4.3 times as much coal and electricity to produce 
US$1 worth of GDP as the United States, 7.7 times as much as Germany 
and France and 11.5 times as much as Japan. Already green GDP and 
sustainable development have become part of the ofﬁcial policies and 
an integral part of the concept of harmonious society. However, it is 
doubtful whether the Chinese government would be willing to prioritize 
sustainable development over continued high growth.
The Chinese leadership realizes that economic competition between 
nations is in fact between each nation's large enterprises and groups. 
Wu Bangguo formulated the government's position in 1998 when he 
claimed that the US relies on General Motors, Boeing and Dupont and a 
batch of other multinational companies and stated that China's position 
in the international economic order to a large extent will be determined 
by whether or not China's large enterprises can develop a position in 
the international economic order. However, China's big SOEs are still 
comparatively small in terms of market capitalization, revenues, R&D 
outlays etc. China only has three companies in the FT 500, which ranks 
ﬁrms by market capitalization and not a single one among the world's 
top 300 companies by R&D expenditure (Nolan 2004: 19-20). However, 
the Chinese government has not given up, even though CNOOC's failed 
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attempt to acquire the California-based oil company Unocal in the sum-
mer of 2005 shows the difﬁculties involved. The government has now put 
extra resources into helping their SOEs become big global players.
'Building a New Socialist Countryside'
One of the major historical tasks for the Chinese leadership is to improve 
conditions in the countryside. It is high time, since the situation in many 
rural areas is tense due to low income, lack of land and an appalling 
lack of basic health services. The Five-Year Plan stipulates it is necessary 
to build a new socialist countryside (jianshe shehui zhuyi xin nongcun). 
Measures to achieve this goal include increasing investment at all levels 
in agriculture and the rural areas, including expanding the scope of 
public ﬁnance. The new Five-Year Plan also calls on government at all 
levels to provide the necessary public services and introduce a new type 
of cooperative medical system. There is also a focus on universalizing a 
nine-year compulsory education system in rural areas and exempting 
students in rural areas from miscellaneous fees and providing them 
with free textbooks and boarding allowances. 
The plan also calls for an effort to increase farm income. Since 1985 
income differences between rural and urban areas have increased sig-
niﬁcantly, overturning the gains from agricultural reform in the late 
1970s and the early 1980s. The widening income gap between city and 
countryside has turned China into one of the most unequal societies 
in Asia and has the potential of undermining the regime's legitimacy 
among the peasants. The new Hu–Wen leadership has put the issues of 
the so-called 'three rural issues' (agriculture, rural areas and the farmers) 
at the top of its agenda, and in March 2005, in his report to the National 
People's Congress, Wen Jiabao announced a nation-wide exemption of 
agricultural taxes in 2005. The plan is to abolish all agricultural taxes 
within three years. Already many provinces have passed measures 
exempting the levy of agricultural tax. The Five-Year Plan conﬁrmed 
these attempts to alleviate the situation in the countryside.
The most pressing issue in the rural areas concerns the land. Rapid 
industrialization and urbanization have caused the availability of arable 
land to drop from 113 million hectares in 1998 to 100 million hectares in 
2003 and average per capita availability of farmland is below the Food 
and Agriculture Organization's (FAO's) critical threshold (0.05 ha). As 
a consequence of more and more arable land being expropriated by the 
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authorities for industrial and housing construction and infrastructural 
projects, issues related to the use of land have become a major source 
of dispute. In 2003 alone 160,000 cases of illegal and arbitrary land 
requisition were uncovered and unauthorized construction activities 
encroached on 35,000 km2 of land—equivalent to the surface area of 
Taiwan. In some cases the disputes turned violently as, for example, in 
April 2005, when 20,000 peasants drove off 1,000 riot police in Zhejiang 
Province to defend their land from being expropriated by the authorities. 
Or when on 6 December 2005 the police opened ﬁre against peasants in 
Dongzhou, who were protesting against the building of a power-plant on 
agricultural land; at least 20 protesters were killed. On this most pressing 
issue in the rural areas, the Five-Year Plan stipulates that 'it is necessary 
to uphold the most rigorous farmland protection system, accelerate the 
pace of reforming the land expropriation system, and strengthen the 
mechanism for paying reasonable compensation to farmers whose land 
has been expropriated' (Central Committee Proposal on Formulating 
the 11th Five-Year Program: 5).
Although a latecomer in global trade and commerce, China's economic 
performance in the last two decades has been phenomenal. China's av-
erage growth rate was on average 9.4 percent between 1979 and 2003 
and increased to 9.5 percent in 2004 and 2005. New ofﬁcial estimates 
even mention growth rates of 10 and 10.1 percent in 2004 and 2005 re-
spectively. China is now the world's fourth largest economy and will 
without doubt surpass the UK to become the world's third largest some 
time during 2006. It is also the third largest trading nation in the world 
and may at the end of next year surpass Japan to become the largest 
holder of foreign exchange reserves in the world.
China has during this period of time introduced many elements of 
a market economy. However, there are still some remnants of the old 
command economy. One of those remnants is the Five-Year Plan. Be-
fore the reform, ﬁve-year plans were mandatory and set rather detailed 
production targets. Now the Five-Year Plan serves only as a framework 
for policies or as a catalogue of issues that need to be addressed. All the 
other ﬁve-year plans were called 'jihua' in Chinese, whereas the term 
'guihua' has been used this time. While both can be rendered as 'plan' in 
the English language, 'guihua' has a connotation of a draft or regulatory 
guidelines subject to reinterpretation and change, whereas 'jihua' often 
refers to a  set of concrete plans.
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Conclusion
Rather than focusing on the numerical reductions and quantitative 
changes of the past, the Hu–Wen leadership has chosen to focus on 
qualitative change in its approach to governance and social and eco-
nomic change. As a result a new development strategy has crystallized, 
based on a new concept of 'taking people as the foundation' (yi ren wei 
ben). Taking people as the main foundation underlies another important 
recent idea: the 'scientiﬁc development concept' (kexue fazhanguan).
The new concepts reject the idea that the physical growth of GDP is 
the sole basis on which to assess the success of development. Instead 
they propose a 'people-centred' development strategy that recognizes 
that the ultimate purpose of growth is to meet people's material and 
spiritual needs. The fulﬁlment of this strategy demands the implemen-
tation of a comprehensive and coordinated development designed to 
correct imbalances in key areas, including gaps between urban and rural 
areas, between regions, between economic and social development, 
between human development and environmental preservation and in-
ternal development and external affairs—the so-called ﬁve overarching 
plans (wuge tongchou).
China has on earlier occasions adopted a strategy of balanced de-
velopment and 'macro-economic readjustment', most notably during 
the so-called readjustment and consolidation period in the early 1960s, 
when Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun succeeded in putting the economy 
back on track after the disastrous Great Leap Forward of 1958-60. Also 
during this period there was an attempt to address imbalances in the 
economy and to privilege agricultural incomes and correct a one-sided 
focus on the industrial sector.
However, the stress on sustainable development is new, as is the 
ofﬁcial emphasis that economic policies should be based on considera-
tions that prioritize human development and a number of green issues, 
such as environment, health and general material and spiritual welfare 
rather than continued high growth rates. 
Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard is Professor and Director of the Asia Research Centre, 
Copenhagen Business School
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NOTES
1  In line with the concept of 'harmonious society', the Chinese leadership also advo-
cates the so-called 'new three people's principles' (xin sanmin zhuyi) which is a play 
on the famous 'three people's principles' formulated by Sun Yatzen and constituting 
the ideological core of his Guomindang Party.
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